Research figure: Carl Rogers · Written by Artificial Sapiens
Carl Rogers's internal locus of evaluation is the capacity to evaluate one's experience, choices, and personal direction through an increasingly self-owned process of judgment. Within Rogers's person-centered theory, psychological development involves a movement away from treating other people's approval as the decisive authority for one's worth and toward an appraisal informed by consciously experienced feelings, needs, values, and consequences. This is a theory of the source and organization of personal valuation. It is closely connected with conditions of worth, congruence, organismic valuing, and the fully functioning person. It is conceptually different from Julian Rotter's locus of control, which concerns expectations about the contingency of reinforcements on one's actions. Rogers developed this account across his client-centered writings and later discussion of the valuing process; its precise historical standing and current evidential limits require attention to the original sources. Rogers, 1951; Rogers, 1964; Rotter, 1966.
The meaning of an internal locus of evaluation
The word locus identifies the location of an authority or reference point. In Rogers's formulation, evaluation refers to the personal process by which an individual appraises the significance, desirability, or worth of experience and action. An external locus of evaluation places decisive authority in the judgments of parents, teachers, professional experts, peers, institutions, or other significant people. An internal locus places the immediate responsibility for appraisal increasingly within the person's experience and reflective judgment. The distinction concerns how a judgment becomes one's own, rather than whether other people matter.
For example, a student may select a profession because approval from family members determines whether the student can regard the choice as worthy. Another student may listen carefully to the same family members, consider occupational evidence and material constraints, and ultimately form a decision that the student can endorse. The second pattern illustrates the internal reference point Rogers emphasized. The student remains responsive to evidence, relationships, and practical consequences while exercising responsibility for the final evaluation. The example is an interpretation of Rogers's construct, not a diagnostic classification or an empirical demonstration of the theory.
Rogers linked internally grounded evaluation to openness to experience. As defensiveness diminishes, feelings that had been excluded from awareness may become available for consideration. The person may distinguish a genuinely preferred course of action from one adopted only to secure acceptance. This change is both cognitive and affective: it concerns conscious interpretation, experienced significance, and the willingness to revise conclusions. An internal locus does not imply certainty, stubbornness, self-sufficiency, or permanent consistency. It allows uncertainty and learning to be experienced without relinquishing the authority to evaluate.
Historical emergence: counseling, self theory, and the valuing process
The clinical setting before the mature terminology
Rogers's early career in child guidance and counseling exposed him to individuals whose choices were constrained by authoritative descriptions of their problems. His counseling work gradually moved from professional diagnosis and direction toward understanding the client's phenomenological world. In Counseling and Psychotherapy (1942), the nondirective orientation placed growing emphasis on clients articulating and resolving their own concerns. It is historically sound to regard this clinical movement as an important precursor to his mature account of internal evaluation, while avoiding the claim that every later theoretical term was already fully defined in the early book.
The distinction became clearer in the theoretical and clinical synthesis of Client-Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications, and Theory (1951). The volume makes the client's subjective frame of reference central to therapeutic understanding. The publication also includes contributions by Elaine Dorfman, Nicholas Hobbs, and Thomas Gordon, whose authored work should retain its own attribution. Rogers's theory of the individual's experience, self-organization, and reorganization in a facilitative relationship provided the context in which dependence on external judgment could be analyzed. WorldCat, 1951 edition.
The 1957 conditions and the 1959 theoretical formulation
In his 1957 paper on the necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality change, Rogers described a therapeutic relationship involving psychological contact, client incongruence, therapist congruence, unconditional positive regard, empathic understanding, and at least minimal communication of the relevant therapist attitudes. Internal evaluation was not presented there as an independent seventh therapeutic condition. The theoretical connection is that an atmosphere of accurate understanding and accepting regard could make previously threatening aspects of experience more accessible to the client. That proposed mechanism is an interpretive connection within Rogerian theory, rather than a causal result proved by the 1957 paper. Rogers, 1957.
The longer 1959 chapter, A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships, as Developed in the Client-Centered Framework, set out interrelated propositions about experience, the self, valuing, defensiveness, psychological adjustment, and interpersonal relations. It is particularly important to read locus of evaluation as one element in a systematic account of the self and experience, rather than as an isolated maxim about independence. This chapter appeared in Sigmund Koch's edited volume Psychology: A Study of a Science, volume 3, pages 184–256, published by McGraw-Hill. Bibliographic record.
The 1961 and 1964 developments
In On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy (1961), Rogers described personal growth and the movement toward a more open, self-trusting mode of living. The book is a collection of essays and addresses with differing original contexts. Its treatment of personal evaluation belongs to that larger exploration of becoming, openness, creativity, and interpersonal relationship. The book should not be flattened into a single experiment or treated as the original publication date of every idea appearing within it. WorldCat record.
Rogers returned directly to valuation in his 1964 article Toward a Modern Approach to Values: The Valuing Process in the Mature Person, published in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 68, 160–167. Here the focus is the ongoing process through which a developing person gives experiential significance to possible actions and values. The article is a primary source for understanding his mature account and its philosophical and psychological ambitions. Publication in a peer-reviewed journal establishes the provenance of Rogers's argument; it does not by itself establish the theory's empirical validity. Rogers, 1964.
How external evaluation develops
Conditions of worth and the social origins of self-judgment
Rogers's theory recognizes that human development unfolds within relationships. Children encounter evaluations that communicate affection, disapproval, praise, blame, safety, and expectations. In his account, conditions of worth arise when the person's sense of being acceptable becomes dependent upon satisfying particular evaluative standards. The individual may internalize those standards and treat them as if they were an immediate expression of personal experience. Approval then becomes a criterion through which feelings and possibilities are admitted to or excluded from the self-concept.
An individual may find anger, disappointment, competition, affection, or an unconventional aspiration difficult to acknowledge because such experiences conflict with a valued identity. A person rewarded consistently for appearing agreeable may become anxious when recognizing disagreement. Within Rogers's framework, the crucial psychological process is an alteration of self-appraisal: the person learns to disown experience that threatens conditional acceptance. This explanation is a theoretical model of development. It does not establish that every conflict or emotion necessarily arose through conditional parenting or that a single causal developmental pathway applies across cultures.
Conditional expectations also serve legitimate social functions. Families and communities teach obligations, protect vulnerable members, and transmit hard-won knowledge. The problem Rogers theorized concerns what happens when external judgments become the person's overriding source of self-worth and block accurate recognition of experience. Respect for social relationships and internally grounded valuation can coexist.
Introjection, symbolization, and incongruence
Within the person-centered account, an introjected value is experienced as an imperative derived from an external evaluative system yet incorporated into self-organization. The term should be interpreted in its historical theoretical context; it is not equivalent to a contemporary laboratory measure with a universally agreed operational definition. The individual may represent certain experiences inaccurately in awareness when they threaten the organization of the self. Rogers called discrepancies between experienced organismic processes and self-concept incongruence.
Internal evaluation is therefore related to congruence. A person who can acknowledge an uncomfortable feeling, consider its origin, and decide how to respond has more opportunity to form a judgment consistent with experience. Congruence does not imply automatically acting on each impulse. A felt desire may be ethically unacceptable, factually misguided, or inconsistent with a reflective commitment. The ideal is a more inclusive process of awareness and appraisal in which uncomfortable information can be examined rather than erased.
Organismic valuing and the status of subjective experience
Rogers proposed an organismic valuing process: experience may be assessed according to its perceived capacity to maintain and enhance the developing organism. In his mature theory, a flexible person remains responsive to immediate experience and updates values rather than relying exclusively on rigid standards imported from outside. This has sometimes been simplified into the advice to trust feelings. Such a slogan omits the critical psychological work of interpreting feelings, considering alternatives, anticipating consequences, and remaining open to correction.
The epistemic status of organismic valuing must be specified. It is an organizing theoretical proposition in Rogers's humanistic psychology. It is not an experimentally verified internal sensor that infallibly identifies morally correct choices, healthy partners, or effective treatments. Individuals can misinterpret emotion, misunderstand circumstances, and experience competing needs. Traumatic environments, discrimination, illness, coercion, and material insecurity can also constrain the range of choices that feels available. A scientifically responsible contemporary reading places Rogers's emphasis on experience within a process of reflective and socially situated judgment.
This distinction preserves a central insight: a person can have direct access to the fact that a particular experience matters to them, while still needing additional evidence to decide what that experience means or what action is appropriate. Subjective authority regarding one's experience and objective accuracy regarding external events are different questions.
Internal evaluation, autonomy, and self-direction
Personal autonomy names a broad family of capacities and social conditions involving meaningful choice, self-endorsement, responsibility, and the ability to act in accordance with considered commitments. Rogers's internal locus of evaluation is one historical humanistic account of how self-endorsement might develop. It emphasizes the source of appraisal within a relational conception of personality. It cannot be treated as a single validated measure of personal autonomy, because modern autonomy research includes distinct philosophical and psychological constructs.
Three elements clarify the idea. First, autonomy requires some ability to experience and identify personal preferences, concerns, and values. Second, it requires evaluating those materials in light of other people, available evidence, and likely consequences. Third, it involves taking ownership of a decision while retaining the possibility of revision. Social dependence does not automatically remove autonomy: patients can make autonomous choices with informed clinical assistance, children can develop agency through dependable guidance, and collaborative decisions can express personal endorsement.
Rogers's approach locates a significant developmental task in shifting from a self organized around anticipated approval toward a self able to respond flexibly to experience. Such a movement may include dissent, but the aim is not compulsory dissent. A person can independently endorse inherited practices, established knowledge, communal responsibility, or a professional recommendation. The decisive theoretical issue is whether the individual understands and owns that endorsement.
Rogers's locus of evaluation versus Rotter's locus of control
The similarly worded constructs arise from different research programs. Julian B. Rotter's 1966 monograph introduced generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement within social learning theory. Its central question concerns whether people expect rewards, outcomes, and reinforcement to depend on their own behavior or on luck, chance, powerful others, or factors outside their control. Rotter described instrument development and investigations of individual differences in these generalized expectations. Rotter, 1966.
Rogers's internal locus of evaluation asks whose standards make an experience or action valuable and how the person arrives at an evaluative judgment. Rotter's internal locus of control asks what a person expects to cause outcomes. Someone can hold an internally grounded personal value while accurately acknowledging limited control over employment, illness, political decisions, or the actions of others. Conversely, a person may strongly believe in personal control of outcomes while choosing goals primarily to win approval. These theoretically possible combinations show why the constructs cannot be substituted for one another.
Rotter's work has an explicit operational tradition, including an internal–external control scale developed in a specific measurement and social-learning context. Rogers's notion is embedded in a clinical theory of self, value, and growth and has been studied using varied methods rather than one universally accepted, historically original internal-locus-of-evaluation test. A researcher must specify the construct and actual instrument rather than label any self-report autonomy questionnaire a measure of Rogers's concept.
Nor is Rogers's evaluation construct the same as self-efficacy, a belief about one's capability to accomplish particular actions, or perceived behavioral control, an expectation about the ease or difficulty of performing a behavior. These constructs may correlate in some samples, but any empirical equivalence requires direct measurement and discriminant-validation evidence.
Relationship to self-determination theory
Edward Deci and Richard Ryan's self-determination theory provides an independently developed and extensively investigated framework for autonomous and controlled motivation. It examines the quality of motivation and the satisfaction or frustration of needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Its distinction between autonomous and controlled regulation intersects with Rogers's concern about external approval and internal endorsement, yet it has its own definitions, measurement programs, mechanisms, and research literature. The two traditions should be compared rather than merged or retrospectively assigned to Rogers. Ryan and Deci, 2000.
Self-determination theory also clarifies that autonomy is compatible with accepting guidance. A student freely endorsing a teacher's explanation can be autonomously motivated; a student obeying from fear of humiliation exemplifies a different motivational structure. Such findings can illuminate present-day questions suggested by Rogers, but they do not directly test the complete organismic self theory he formulated in the 1950s.
A large review of meta-analyses found broad support for important self-determination-theory propositions across domains, while identifying qualifications and research gaps. A meta-analysis of randomized health-behavior interventions based on self-determination theory reported modest average effects and tested motivational pathways. These studies support the relevance of autonomy-supportive processes in defined contexts; they are not proof that Rogers's historical internal locus of evaluation is a single necessary or sufficient cause of flourishing. Ryan and colleagues' research tradition; health RCT meta-analysis.
The therapeutic relationship as a context for autonomy
Why a facilitative relationship matters in the theory
Rogers presented therapeutic relationships as opportunities for clients to experience reduced threat and increased freedom to acknowledge their own experience. Empathic understanding, therapist congruence, and unconditional positive regard are central relational conditions in his account. When clients perceive that a therapist attempts to understand their own frame of reference, they may become more able to recognize and consider feelings previously organized around anticipated judgment. This is the proposed person-centered mechanism connecting relational safety to internal evaluation. Rogers, 1957.
A practitioner oriented toward this aim does not declare that the client must reject a relationship, change a career, or disregard advice in order to become autonomous. Instead, the clinical task involves helping the client articulate what matters, recognize competing influences, inspect the personal significance of alternatives, and understand the range of available choices. Support for client agency can coexist with accurate information about risk and professional obligations. In clinical emergencies or when capacity to consent is impaired, ethical and legal duties may constrain ordinary processes of shared decision-making.
Nondirectiveness, information, and professional responsibility
The historical nondirective orientation opposed therapist domination of the client's personal meaning. It should not be interpreted as a blanket refusal to provide evidence-based information, complete risk assessment, discuss medical options, or observe safeguarding duties. Contemporary practice must integrate informed consent, professional competence, scope of practice, accessibility, and a patient's right to receive accurate information about treatment choices and alternatives. A client's internal evaluation is not a clinical diagnostic criterion or a license to substitute intuition for indicated care.
When a therapist asks whose judgment a client is relying on, the question can be productive only in a context that respects actual economic and interpersonal constraints. A person facing an abusive relationship, racism, disability-related barriers, or financial dependence may need concrete protective resources in addition to reflective exploration. Autonomy should be assessed in relation to feasible options rather than judged solely from the language of self-confidence.
What psychotherapy research can establish
The broad therapeutic relationship literature provides empirical context for Rogers's clinical proposals. An updated meta-analysis of therapist empathy found a positive association between empathy and client outcome across 82 independent samples and 6,138 clients, with heterogeneity and measurement differences. A meta-analysis of positive regard likewise found a small positive association with psychotherapy outcome. A large alliance meta-analysis confirmed a robust relationship between therapeutic alliance and outcome across treatments. Elliott et al., 2018; Farber et al., 2018; Flückiger et al., 2018.
These are important observations about relational processes; none isolates the internal locus of evaluation as the causal mediator of treatment outcome. Correlations between therapist qualities and later improvement may reflect reciprocal influence, preexisting patient characteristics, measurement overlap, therapeutic responsiveness, or unmeasured factors. Even when longitudinal designs strengthen interpretation, they do not automatically demonstrate that a particular Rogerian condition is necessary and sufficient for all therapeutic change.
Modern investigations of autonomous motivation during counseling and psychotherapy also suggest associations between perceived autonomy support, autonomous treatment motivation, and outcomes. Zuroff and Koestner's 2023 scholarly synthesis examines autonomy support as a potential common factor across treatment orientations and explicitly discusses methodological limitations. This converges with aspects of Rogers's clinical intuition while grounding the empirical claims in an independently specified motivational framework. Zuroff and Koestner, 2023.
A stringent test of Rogers's full account would require instruments that identify what is meant by an internal source of personal evaluation, distinguish it from perceived control and general well-being, show reliable change, and test whether that change precedes independently measured outcomes. Designs must also consider treatment allocation, therapist effects, shared-method bias, adverse outcomes, baseline autonomy, and cultural context. The absence of such a single decisive evidence base means claims about clinical necessity or sufficiency remain contested.
Measuring internal evaluation: research design and construct validity
A serious measurement program begins by stating observable indicators. Researchers might examine whether people can articulate self-endorsed reasons for decisions, whether their evaluative judgments remain stable when mere social approval changes, whether they revise those judgments after receiving credible evidence, and whether they can describe their own emotions without equating emotions with instructions for action. These are proposed operational directions, not a canonical Rogers scale.
Self-reports are efficient but vulnerable to social-desirability effects, item wording, and a paradoxical desire to appear independent. Interviews can capture complex meaning-making but require transparent coding and interrater reliability. Experience-sampling methods can examine actual decisions as they unfold yet may still rely on subjective attribution. Behavioral experiments manipulating approval cues may reveal sensitivity to social evaluation but must distinguish reasonable social learning from compulsive dependence on acceptance.
Convergent validity would ask whether measures relate in theoretically predicted ways to self-endorsement and openness. Discriminant validity would require separating them from Rotter's control expectancies, generalized self-esteem, assertiveness, conscientiousness, personality, self-efficacy, and symptom severity. Measurement invariance would matter across age, language, disability, and cultural settings. Longitudinal and experimental designs would be needed to investigate directionality. Without these steps, a claim that a study demonstrates Rogers's internal locus is stronger than its method warrants.
Autonomy across culture, relationships, and social conditions
Rogers's emphasis on self-directed evaluation speaks to a real tension between personal experience and external expectations. Its interpretation must account for social practices in which choice is relational, negotiated, and embedded in mutual duties. The ability to endorse obligations voluntarily can reflect autonomy, while apparent independence can conceal isolation, coercion, or self-deception. Cultural frameworks may differ in how people express self-authorship without implying that any community lacks autonomous persons.
Research must therefore separate the experience of willing endorsement from outwardly individualistic behavior. A decision to care for a relative, enter a communal vocation, or preserve a family practice can express internally owned values. Likewise, public expressions of independence may be motivated chiefly by fear of social judgment. This is a theoretically important distinction that also prevents crude cultural ranking.
The material conditions of choice matter. Meaningful agency may be restricted by insecure housing, violence, discrimination, unequal access to education, disability accommodations, or other constraints. A clinician or educator should avoid interpreting every externally constrained decision as personal failure to develop an internal locus. Context can shape both the available alternatives and the consequences attached to exercising a preference.
The normative challenge: can inner judgment be mistaken?
Rogers's theory assigns profound psychological importance to lived experience. A mature interpretation still needs to distinguish authentic endorsement from accurate knowledge or ethical justification. Feelings supply information about what someone is experiencing; they do not independently establish the truth of a belief. Personal values can conflict with the legitimate rights of others. A satisfying choice can have harmful long-term consequences. An internally chosen treatment may be ineffective. These are reasons to understand inner valuation as a fallible and revisable process.
One challenge concerns the normative standard of growth. Rogers often described a direction toward openness, integration, and fuller functioning. Whether those features constitute a universal good is a philosophical and empirical question requiring argument and study. Research might examine links between flexible self-evaluation, psychological adjustment, or participation in relationships, but correlations with preferred outcomes cannot by themselves establish a universal ethical theory.
A second challenge concerns authority. Medical professionals, educators, and trusted communities possess forms of expertise that are often necessary for good decisions. An internally grounded process can incorporate their knowledge while preserving the person's capacity to evaluate, ask questions, and give meaningful consent. Rogers's account is most defensible when applied to the ownership of a decision, coupled with disciplined attention to evidence and other people's legitimate interests.
Educational, clinical, and interpersonal applications
In education, teachers can invite students to reflect on the reasons they accept feedback, compare interpretations of their work, and develop criteria for evaluating progress. Autonomy-supportive teaching may offer meaningful choices and explanations of requirements while maintaining academic standards. Meta-analytic evidence in education links autonomy-supportive environments with psychological-need satisfaction and autonomous motivation, though these data principally test self-determination theory constructs rather than Rogers's complete valuation theory. Educational motivation meta-analysis.
In counseling and psychotherapy, this framework can focus attention on personal agency within a safe, informed relationship. A clinician may explore where evaluative standards came from, how they function, and whether they still reflect the client's considered commitments. Such conversations remain subject to individualized assessment, culturally responsive practice, evidence-based treatment planning, and the client's preferences. Internal locus of evaluation is a conceptual lens, not a diagnosis, stand-alone clinical intervention, or validated predictor of recovery.
In ordinary interpersonal relationships, the construct offers a language for distinguishing feedback from subordination of judgment. Listening to a partner's concerns can coexist with independently evaluating a decision. A person's ability to say that an important choice is their own should be accompanied by responsibility for its effects. Mutual respect can strengthen reflective agency rather than extinguish it.
Scientific assessment: established, preliminary, limited, and contested
Established historical evidence includes Rogers's publication of the 1951 client-centered synthesis, his 1957 therapeutic-conditions paper, the systematic 1959 theory chapter, the 1961 book of essays, and his 1964 analysis of valuing. Rotter's 1966 research program addressed a distinct internal–external control construct. These facts are supported by publisher, bibliographic, and journal records.
Established empirical evidence also supports associations between several therapeutic relationship factors and psychotherapy outcomes, and a substantial independent research literature examines autonomy-supportive motivation. These bodies of evidence do not amount to direct confirmation of every proposition in Rogers's self theory. Elliott et al., 2018; Flückiger et al., 2018; Gillison et al., 2019.
Preliminary or limited claims include precise pathways by which a person-centered encounter changes an individual's internal locus of evaluation, whether any such shift mediates improvement beyond other measured processes, and how consistently the historical construct can be operationalized across populations. These questions call for independent outcome measures, preregistered longitudinal tests, robust intervention comparisons, and clear construct definitions.
Contested claims include strong assertions that one specified set of relational conditions is universally necessary and sufficient for change; that organismic valuation reliably produces optimal choices; or that increased self-reliance alone solves social, developmental, or clinical difficulties. The question of how autonomy should be defined across cultural and material circumstances likewise remains an active theoretical issue.
Frequently asked questions
What is Carl Rogers's internal locus of evaluation?
It is the internalization of responsibility for evaluating one's experiences and choices through self-owned, revisable judgment. Rogers connected it to psychological openness, congruence, and growth in the person-centered tradition. It describes the source of evaluation rather than personal power over outcomes.
How does an external locus of evaluation appear in everyday life?
A person may rely on praise, disapproval, social prestige, or an authority figure to decide whether an experience is acceptable or a choice worthwhile. External guidance itself is ordinary and often beneficial; the relevant theoretical question is whether the person treats approval as the decisive condition of self-worth and personal judgment.
Is internal locus of evaluation the same as internal locus of control?
No. Rogers's concept centers on valuation and whose judgment is treated as authoritative. Rotter's concept centers on perceived control over reinforcement and outcomes. The constructs belong to different research traditions and should be measured separately. Rotter, 1966.
Does an internal locus mean ignoring criticism or advice?
It permits serious consideration of criticism and qualified advice while preserving personal responsibility for weighing their relevance. Revising a belief in response to good evidence can express autonomy as clearly as holding a well-considered commitment.
Did Rogers create self-determination theory?
No. Self-determination theory was developed by Edward Deci and Richard Ryan. It provides independently defined and researched constructs of autonomous motivation, competence, and relatedness, with points of conceptual contact with Rogers's humanistic psychology. Ryan and Deci, 2000.
Is a strong internal locus of evaluation a mental health diagnosis or treatment?
It is a theoretical construct, not a DSM or ICD diagnosis. No individual treatment recommendation follows merely from classifying someone's perceived source of evaluation. Clinical care depends on evidence-based assessment, shared decision-making, context, and professional judgment.
Can Rogers's idea be empirically tested?
Researchers can formulate and validate measures of the degree to which choices are personally endorsed, how social approval influences appraisal, and whether changes predict later outcomes. Such measures need discriminant validity and prospective designs. Empirical support for autonomy or therapeutic empathy must not be reported as direct proof of the entire Rogerian construct unless that construct was actually tested.
Related Articles
Carl Rogers — The central scientific chapter on Rogers's life, work, and person-centered approach.
Carl Rogers's Conditions of Worth and the Development of Self — How conditional social approval enters Rogers's theory of personality development.
Carl Rogers's Self-Concept Theory: Real Self, Ideal Self, and Experience — The organization of self-perception and its relation to experience.
Carl Rogers's Congruence and Incongruence: Authenticity and Psychological Change — Congruence between awareness and experience within Rogers's theory.
Carl Rogers's Actualizing Tendency: Growth, Motivation, and Criticism — The developmental orientation underlying his account of change.
Carl Rogers's Fully Functioning Person and the Good Life — Rogers's account of openness and constructive living.
References
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Farber, B. A., Suzuki, J. Y., and Lynch, D. A. (2018). Positive regard and psychotherapy outcome: A meta-analytic review. Psychotherapy, 55(4), 411–423. https://doi.org/10.1037/pst0000171.
Flückiger, C., Del Re, A. C., Wampold, B. E., and Horvath, A. O. (2018). The alliance in adult psychotherapy: A meta-analytic synthesis. Psychotherapy, 55(4), 316–340. https://doi.org/10.1037/pst0000172.
Gillison, F. B., Rouse, P., Standage, M., Sebire, S. J., and Ryan, R. M. (2019). A meta-analysis of techniques to promote motivation for health behaviour change from a self-determination theory perspective. Health Psychology Review, 13(1), 110–130. https://doi.org/10.1080/17437199.2018.1534071.
Rogers, C. R. (1951). Client-centered therapy: Its current practice, implications, and theory. Houghton Mifflin. WorldCat bibliographic record.
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Rogers, C. R. (1959). A theory of therapy, personality, and interpersonal relationships, as developed in the client-centered framework. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A study of a science (Vol. 3, pp. 184–256). McGraw-Hill. Scholarly bibliography.
Rogers, C. R. (1961). On becoming a person: A therapist's view of psychotherapy. Houghton Mifflin. WorldCat bibliographic record.
Rogers, C. R. (1964). Toward a modern approach to values: The valuing process in the mature person. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 68, 160–167. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0046419.
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 80(1), 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0092976.
Ryan, R. M., and Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55(1), 68–78. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68.
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